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ABSTRACT
Several recent works have developed methods for training classifiers that are cer-
tifiably robust against norm-bounded adversarial perturbations. These methods
assume that all the adversarial transformations are equally important, which is sel-
dom the case in real-world applications. We advocate for cost-sensitive robustness
as the criteria for measuring the classifier’s performance for tasks where some
adversarial transformation are more important than others. We encode the potential
harm of each adversarial transformation in a cost matrix, and propose a general
objective function to adapt the robust training method of Wong & Kolter (2018)
to optimize for cost-sensitive robustness. Our experiments on simple MNIST and
CIFAR10 models with a variety of cost matrices show that the proposed approach
can produce models with substantially reduced cost-sensitive robust error, while
maintaining classification accuracy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Despite the exceptional performance of deep neural networks (DNNs) on various machine learning
tasks such as malware detection (Saxe & Berlin, 2015), face recognition (Parkhi et al., 2015) and
autonomous driving (Bojarski et al., 2016), recent studies (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al.,
2015) have shown that deep learning models are vulnerable to misclassifying inputs, known as
adversarial examples, that are crafted with targeted but visually-imperceptible perturbations. While
several defense mechanisms have been proposed and empirically demonstrated to be successful
against existing particular attacks (Papernot et al., 2016; Goodfellow et al., 2015), new attacks
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Trame`r et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018) are repeatedly found that
circumvent such defenses. To end this arm race, recent works (Wong & Kolter, 2018; Raghunathan
et al., 2018; Wong et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018) propose methods to certify examples to be robust
against some specific norm-bounded adversarial perturbations for given inputs and to train models to
optimize for certifiable robustness.
However, all of the aforementioned methods aim at improving the overall robustness of the classifier.
This means that the methods to improve robustness are designed to prevent seed examples in any
class from being misclassified as any other class. Achieving such a goal (at least for some definitions
of adversarial robustness) requires producing a perfect classifier, and has, unsurprisingly, remained
elusive. Indeed, Mahloujifar et al. (2019) proved that if the metric probability space is concentrated,
overall adversarial robustness is unattainable for any classifier with initial constant error.
We argue that overall robustness may not be the appropriate criteria for measuring system perfor-
mance in security-sensitive applications, since only certain kinds of adversarial misclassifications
pose meaningful threats that provide value for potential adversaries. Whereas overall robustness
places equal emphasis on every adversarial transformation, from a security perspective, only certain
transformations matter. As a simple example, misclassifying a malicious program as benign results
in more severe consequences than the reverse.
In this paper, we propose a general method for adapting provable defenses against norm-bounded
perturbations to take into account the potential harm of different adversarial class transformations.
Inspired by cost-sensitive learning (Domingos, 1999; Elkan, 2001) for non-adversarial contexts, we
capture the impact of different adversarial class transformations using a cost matrix C, where each
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entry represents the cost of an adversary being able to take a natural example from the first class and
perturb it so as to be misclassified by the model as the second class. Instead of reducing the overall
robust error, our goal is to minimize the cost-weighted robust error (which we define for both binary
and real-valued costs in C). The proposed method incorporates the specified cost matrix into the
training objective function, which encourages stronger robustness guarantees on cost-sensitive class
transformations, while maintaining the overall classification accuracy on the original inputs.
Contributions. By encoding the consequences of different adversarial transformations into a cost
matrix, we introduce the notion of cost-sensitive robustness (Section 3.1) as a metric to assess the
expected performance of a classifier when facing adversarial examples. We propose an objective
function for training a cost-sensitive robust classifier (Section 3.2). The proposed method is general in
that it can incorporate any type of cost matrix, including both binary and real-valued. We demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed cost-sensitive defense model for a variety of cost scenarios on
two benchmark image classification datasets: MNIST (Section 4.1) and CIFAR10 (Section 4.2).
Compared with the state-of-the-art overall robust defense model (Wong & Kolter, 2018), our model
achieves significant improvements in cost-sensitive robustness for different tasks, while maintaining
approximately the same classification accuracy on both datasets.
Notation. We use lower-case boldface letters such as x for vectors and capital boldface letters such
as A to represent matrices. Let [m] be the index set {1, 2, . . . ,m} and Aij be the (i, j)-th entry of
matrix A. Denote the i-th natural basis vector, the all-ones vector and the identity matrix by ei, 1
and I respectively. For any vector x ∈ Rd, the `∞-norm of x is defined as ‖x‖∞ = maxi∈[d] |xi|.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a brief introduction on related topics, including neural network classifiers,
adversarial examples, defenses with certified robustness, and cost-sensitive learning.
2.1 NEURAL NETWORK CLASSIFIERS
A K-layer neural network classifier can be represented by a function f : X → Y such that
f(x) = fK−1(fK−2(· · · (f1(x)))), for any x ∈ X . For k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K−2}, the mapping function
fk(·) typically consists of two operations: an affine transformation (either matrix multiplication or
convolution) and a nonlinear activation. In this paper, we consider rectified linear unit (ReLU) as the
activation function. If denote the feature vector of the k-th layer as zk, then fk(·) is defined as
zk+1 = fk(zk) = max{Wkzk + bk,0}, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . .K − 2},
where Wk denotes the weight parameter matrix and bk the bias vector. The output function fK−1(·)
maps the feature vector in the last hidden layer to the output space Y solely through matrix multi-
plication: zK = fK−1(zK−1) = WK−1zK−1 + bK−1, where zK can be regarded as the estimated
score vector of input x for different possible output classes. In the following discussions, we use fθ
to represent the neural network classifier, where θ = {W1, . . . ,WK−1, b1, . . . , bK−1} denotes the
model parameters.
To train the neural network, a loss function
∑N
i=1 L(fθ(xi), yi) is defined for a set of training
examples {xi, yi}Ni=1, where xi is the i-th input vector and yi denotes its class label. Cross-entropy
loss is typically used for multiclass image classification. With proper initialization, all model
parameters are then updated iteratively using backpropagation. For any input example x˜, the predicted
label ŷ is given by the index of the largest predicted score among all classes, argmaxj [fθ(x˜)]j .
2.2 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
An adversarial example is an input, generated by some adversary, which is visually indistinguishable
from an example from the natural distribution, but is able to mislead the target classifier. Since “visu-
ally indistinguishable” depends on human perception, which is hard to define rigorously, we consider
the most popular alternative: input examples with perturbations bounded in `∞-norm (Goodfellow
et al., 2015). More formally, the set of adversarial examples with respect to seed example {x0, y0}
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and classifier fθ(·) is defined as
A(x0, y0; θ) =
{
x ∈ X : ‖x− x0‖∞ ≤  and argmax
j
[fθ(x)]j 6= y0
}
, (2.1)
where  > 0 denotes the maximum perturbation distance. Although `p distances are commonly used
in adversarial examples research, they are not an adequate measure of perceptual similarity (Sharif
et al., 2018) and other minimal geometric transformations can be used to find adversarial exam-
ples (Engstrom et al., 2017; Kanbak et al., 2018; Xiao et al., 2018). Nevertheless, there is considerable
interest in improving robustness in this simple domain, and hope that as this research area matures
we will find ways to apply results from studying simplified problems to more realistic ones.
2.3 DEFENSES WITH CERTIFIED ROBUSTNESS
A line of recent work has proposed defenses that are guaranteed to be robust against norm-bounded
adversarial perturbations. Hein & Andriushchenko (2017) proved formal robustness guarantees
against `2-norm bounded perturbations for two-layer neural networks, and provided a training method
based on a surrogate robust bound. Raghunathan et al. (2018) developed an approach based on
semidefinite relaxation for training certified robust classifiers, but was limited to two-layer fully-
connected networks. Our work builds most directly on Wong & Kolter (2018), which can be applied
to deep ReLU-based networks and achieves the state-of-the-art certified robustness on MNIST dataset.
Following the definitions in Wong & Kolter (2018), an adversarial polytope Z(x) with respect to a
given example x is defined as
Z(x) =
{
fθ(x+ ∆) : ‖∆‖∞ ≤ 
}
, (2.2)
which contains all the possible output vectors for the given classifier fθ by perturbing x within an
`∞-norm ball with radius . A seed example, {x0, y0}, is said to be certified robust with respect
to maximum perturbation distance , if the corresponding adversarial example set A(x0, y0; θ) is
empty. Equivalently, if we solve, for any output class ytarg 6= y0, the optimization problem,
minimize
zK
[zK ]y0 − [zK ]ytarg , subject to zK ∈ Z(x0), (2.3)
then according to the definition ofA(x0, y0; θ) in (2.1), {x0, y0} is guaranteed to be robust provided
that the optimal objective value of (2.3) is positive for every output class. To train a robust model
on a given dataset {xi, yi}Ni=1, the standard robust optimization aims to minimize the sample loss
function on the worst-case locations through the following adversarial loss
minimize
θ
N∑
i=1
max
‖∆‖∞≤
L(fθ(xi + ∆), yi), (2.4)
where L(·, ·) denotes the cross-entropy loss. However, due to the nonconvexity of the neural network
classifier fθ(·) introduced by the nonlinear ReLU activation, both the adversarial polytope (2.2) and
training objective (2.4) are highly nonconvex. In addition, solving optimization problem (2.3) for
each pair of input example and output class is computationally intractable.
Instead of solving the optimization problem directly, Wong & Kolter (2018) proposed an alternative
training objective function based on convex relaxation, which can be efficiently optimized through a
dual network. Specifically, they relaxed Z(x) into a convex outer adversarial polytope Z˜(x) by
replacing the ReLU inequalities for each neuron z = max{ẑ, 0} with a set of inequalities,
z ≥ 0, z ≥ ẑ, −uẑ + (u− `)z ≤ −u`, (2.5)
where u, ` denote the lower and upper bounds on the considered pre-ReLU activation.1 Based on the
relaxed outer bound Z˜(x), they propose the following alternative optimization problem,
minimize
zK
[zK ]y0 − [zK ]ytarg , subject to zK ∈ Z˜(x0), (2.6)
which is in fact a linear program. Since Z(x) ⊆ Z˜(x) for any x ∈ X , solving (2.6) for all
output classes provides stronger robustness guarantees compared with (2.3), provided all the optimal
1The elementwise activation bounds can be computed efficiently using Algorithm 1 in Wong & Kolter (2018).
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objective values are positive. In addition, they derived a guaranteed lower bound, denoted by
J
(
x0, gθ(ey0 − eytarg)
)
, on the optimal objective value of Equation 2.6 using duality theory, where
gθ(·) is aK-layer feedforward dual network (Theorem 1 in Wong & Kolter (2018)). Finally, according
to the properties of cross-entropy loss, they minimize the following objective to train the robust
model, which serves as an upper bound of the adversarial loss (2.4):
minimize
θ
1
N
N∑
i=1
L
(
− J
(
xi, gθ(eyi · 1> − I)
)
, yi
)
, (2.7)
where gθ(·) is regarded as a columnwise function when applied to a matrix. Although the proposed
method in Wong & Kolter (2018) achieves certified robustness, its computational complexity is
quadratic with the network size in the worst case so it only scales to small networks. Recently, Wong
et al. (2018) extended the training procedure to scale to larger networks by using nonlinear random
projections. However, if the network size allows for both methods, we observe a small decrease in
performance using the training method provided in Wong et al. (2018). Therefore, we only use the
approximation techniques for the experiments on CIFAR10 (§4.2), and use the less scalable method
for the MNIST experiments (§4.1).
2.4 COST-SENSITIVE LEARNING
Cost-sensitive learning (Domingos, 1999; Elkan, 2001; Liu & Zhou, 2006) was proposed to deal
with unequal misclassification costs and class imbalance problems commonly found in classification
applications. The key observation is that cost-blind learning algorithms tend to overwhelm the
major class, but the neglected minor class is often our primary interest. For example, in medical
diagnosis misclassifying a rare cancerous lesion as benign is extremely costly. Various cost-sensitive
learning algorithms (Kukar & Kononenko, 1998; Zadrozny et al., 2003; Zhou & Liu, 2010; Khan
et al., 2018) have been proposed in literature, but only a few algorithms, limited to simple classifiers,
considered adversarial settings.2 Dalvi et al. (2004) studied the naive Bayes classifier for spam
detection in the presence of a cost-sensitive adversary, and developed an adversary-aware classifier
based on game theory. Asif et al. (2015) proposed a cost-sensitive robust minimax approach that
hardens a linear discriminant classifier with robustness in the adversarial context. All of these
methods are designed for simple linear classifiers, and cannot be directly extended to neural network
classifiers. In addition, the robustness of their proposed classifier is only examined experimentally
based on the performance against some specific adversary, so does not provide any notion of certified
robustness. Recently, Dreossi et al. (2018) advocated for the idea of using application-level semantics
in adversarial analysis, however, they didn’t provide a formal method on how to train such classifier.
Our work provides a practical training method that hardens neural network classifiers with certified
cost-sensitive robustness against adversarial perturbations.
3 TRAINING A COST-SENSITIVE ROBUST CLASSIFIER
The approach introduced in Wong & Kolter (2018) penalizes all adversarial class transformations
equally, even though the consequences of adversarial examples usually depends on the specific class
transformations. Here, we provide a formal definition of cost-sensitive robustness (§3.1) and propose
a general method for training cost-sensitive robust models (§3.2).
3.1 CERTIFIED COST-SENSITIVE ROBUSTNESS
Our approach uses a cost matrix C that encodes the cost (i.e., potential harm to model deployer)
of different adversarial examples. First, we consider the case where there are m classes and C
is a m × m binary matrix with Cjj′ ∈ {0, 1}. The value Cjj′ indicates whether we care about
an adversary transforming a seed input in class j into one recognized by the model as being in
class j′. If the adversarial transformation j → j′ matters, Cjj′ = 1, otherwise Cjj′ = 0. Let
Ωj = {j′ ∈ [m] : Cjj′ 6= 0} be the index set of output classes that induce cost with respect to
2Given the vulnerability of standard classifiers to adversarial examples, it is not surprising that standard
cost-sensitive classifiers are also ineffective against adversaries. The experiments described in Appendix B
supported this expectation.
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input class j. For any j ∈ [m], let δj = 0 if Ωj is an empty set, and δj = 1 otherwise. We are
only concerned with adversarial transformations from a seed class j to target classes j′ ∈ Ωj . For
any example x in seed class j, x is said to be certified cost-sensitive robust if the lower bound
J(x, gθ(ej − ej′)) ≥ 0 for all j′ ∈ Ωj . That is, no adversarial perturbations in an `∞-norm ball
around x with radius  can mislead the classifier to any target class in Ωj .
The cost-sensitive robust error on a dataset {xi, yi}Ni=1 is defined as the number of examples that are
not guaranteed to be cost-sensitive robust over the number of non-zero cost candidate seed examples:
cost-sensitive robust error = 1− #{i ∈ [N ] : J(xi, gθ(eyi − ej′)) ≥ 0,∀j
′ ∈ Ωyi}∑
j|δj=1 Nj
,
where #A represents the cardinality of a set A, and Nj is the total number of examples in class j.
Next, we consider a more general case whereC is am×m real-valued cost matrix. Each entry ofC is
a non-negative real number, which represents the cost of the corresponding adversarial transformation.
To take into account the different potential costs among adversarial examples, we measure the cost-
sensitive robustness by the average certified cost of adversarial examples. The cost of an adversarial
example x in class j is defined as the sum of all Cjj′ such that J(x, gθ(ej − ej′)) < 0. Intuitively
speaking, an adversarial example will induce more cost if it can be adversarially misclassified as more
target classes with high cost. Accordingly, the robust cost is defined as the total cost of adversarial
examples divided by the total number of valued seed examples:
robust cost =
∑
j|δj=1
∑
i|yi=j
∑
j′∈Ωj Cjj′ · 1
(
J(xi, gθ(ej − ej′)) < 0
)∑
j|δj=1 Nj
, (3.1)
where 1(·) denotes the indicator function.
3.2 COST-SENSITIVE ROBUST OPTIMIZATION
Recall that our goal is to develop a classifier with certified cost-sensitive robustness, as defined in
§3.1, while maintaining overall classification accuracy. According to the guaranteed lower bound,
J
(
x0, gθ(ey0−eytarg)
)
on Equation 2.6 and inspired by the cost-sensitive CE loss (Khan et al., 2018),
we propose the following robust optimization with respect to a neural network classifier fθ:
minimize
θ
1
N
∑
i∈[N ]
L(fθ(xi), yi)
+ α
∑
j∈[m]
δj
Nj
∑
i|yi=j
log
(
1 +
∑
j′∈Ωj
Cjj′ · exp
(− J(xi, gθ(ej − ej′)))), (3.2)
where α ≥ 0 denotes the regularization parameter. The first term in Equation 3.2 denotes the
cross-entropy loss for standard classification, whereas the second term accounts for the cost-sensitive
robustness. Compared with the overall robustness training objective function (2.7), we include a
regularization parameter α to control the trade-off between classification accuracy on original inputs
and adversarial robustness.
To provide cost-sensitivity, the loss function selectively penalizes the adversarial examples based on
their cost. For binary cost matrixes, the regularization term penalizes every cost-sensitive adversarial
example equally, but has no impact for instances where Cjj′ = 0. For the real-valued costs, a larger
value of Cjj′ increases the weight of the corresponding adversarial transformation in the training
objective. This optimization problem (3.2) can be solved efficiently using gradient-based algorithms,
such as stochastic gradient descent and ADAM (Kingma & Ba, 2015).
4 EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the performance of our cost-sensitive robustness training method on models for two
benchmark image classification datasets: MNIST (LeCun et al., 2010) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky &
Hinton, 2009). We compare our results for various cost scenarios with overall robustness training
5
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Figure 1: Preliminary results on MNIST using overall robust classifier: (a) learning curves of the
classification error and overall robust error over the 60 training epochs; (b) heatmap of the robust test
error for pairwise class transformations based on the best trained classifier.
(§2.3) as a baseline. For both datasets, the relevant family of attacks is specified as all the adversarial
perturbations that are bounded in an `∞-norm ball.
Our goal in the experiments is to evaluate how well a variety of different types of cost matrices can
be supported. MNIST and CIFAR-10 are toy datasets, thus there are no obvious cost matrices that
correspond to meaningful security applications for these datasets. Instead, we select representative
tasks and design cost matrices to capture them.
4.1 MNIST
For MNIST, we use the same convolutional neural network architecture (LeCun et al., 1998) as Wong
& Kolter (2018), which includes two convolutional layers, with 16 and 32 filters respectively, and a
two fully-connected layers, consisting of 100 and 10 hidden units respectively. ReLU activations are
applied to each layer except the last one. For both our cost-sensitive robust model and the overall
robust model, we randomly split the 60,000 training samples into five folds of equal size, and train
the classifier over 60 epochs on four of them using the Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2015) with
batch size 50 and learning rate 0.001. We treat the remaining fold as a validation dataset for model
selection. In addition, we use the -scheduling and learning rate decay techniques, where we increase
 from 0.05 to the desired value linearly over the first 20 epochs and decay the learning rate by 0.5
every 10 epochs for the remaining epochs.
Baseline: Overall Robustness. Figure 1(a) illustrates the learning curves of both classification
error and overall robust error during training based on robust loss (2.7) with maximum perturbation
distance  = 0.2. The model with classification error less than 4% and minimum overall robust error
on the validation dataset is selected over the 60 training epochs. The best classifier reaches 3.39%
classification error and 13.80% overall robust error on the 10,000 MNIST testing samples. We report
the robust test error for every adversarial transformation in Figure 1(b) (for the model without any
robustness training all of the values are 100%). The (i, j)-th entry is a bound on the robustness of
that seed-target transformation—the fraction of testing examples in class i that cannot be certified
robust against transformation into class j for any  norm-bounded attack. As shown in Figure 1(b),
the vulnerability to adversarial transformations differs considerably among class pairs and appears
correlated with perceptual similarity. For instance, only 0.26% of seeds in class 1 cannot be certified
robust for target class 9 compare to 10% of seeds from class 9 into class 4.
Binary Cost Matrix.
Next, we evaluate the effectiveness of cost-sensitive robustness training in producing models that are
more robust for adversarial transformations designated as valuable. We consider four types of tasks
defined by different binary cost matrices that capture different sets of adversarial transformations:
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Table 1: Comparisons between different robust defense models on MNIST dataset against `∞ norm-
bounded adversarial perturbations with  = 0.2. The sparsity gives the number of non-zero entries in
the cost matrix over the total number of possible adversarial transformations. The candidates column
is the number of potential seed examples for each task.
Task Description Sparsity Candidates Best α
Classification Error Robust Error
baseline ours baseline ours
single pair
(0,2) 1/90 980 10.0 3.39% 2.68% 0.92% 0.31%
(6,5) 1/90 958 5.0 3.39% 2.49% 3.55% 0.42%
(4,9) 1/90 982 4.0 3.39% 3.00% 10.08% 1.02%
single seed
digit 0 9/90 980 10.0 3.39% 3.48% 3.67% 0.92%
digit 2 9/90 1032 1.0 3.39% 2.91% 14.34% 3.68%
digit 8 9/90 974 0.4 3.39% 3.37% 22.28% 5.75%
single target
digit 1 9/90 8865 4.0 3.39% 3.29% 2.23% 0.14%
digit 5 9/90 9108 2.0 3.39% 3.24% 3.10% 0.29%
digit 8 9/90 9026 1.0 3.39% 3.52% 5.24% 0.54%
multiple
top 10 10/90 6024 0.4 3.39% 3.34% 11.14% 7.02%
random 10 10/90 7028 0.4 3.39% 3.18% 5.01% 2.18%
odd digit 45/90 5074 0.2 3.39% 3.30% 14.45% 9.97%
even digit 45/90 4926 0.1 3.39% 2.82% 13.13% 9.44%
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0%
Cost-sensitive robust error
digit 9
digit 8
digit 7
digit 6
digit 5
digit 4
digit 3
digit 2
digit 1
digit 0 baseline model
our model
(a) single seed class
0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0%
Cost-sensitive robust error
digit 9
digit 8
digit 7
digit 6
digit 5
digit 4
digit 3
digit 2
digit 1
digit 0 baseline model
our model
(b) single target class
Figure 2: Cost-sensitive robust error using the proposed model and baseline model on MNIST for
different binary tasks: (a) treat each digit as the seed class of concern respectively; (b) treat each digit
as the target class of concern respectively.
single pair: particular seed class s to particular target class t; single seed: particular seed class s
to any target class; single target: any seed class to particular target class t; and multiple: multiple
seed and target classes. For each setting, the cost matrix is defined as Cij = 1 if (i, j) is selected;
otherwise, Cij = 0. In general, we expect that the sparser the cost matrix, the more opportunity
there is for cost-sensitive training to improve cost-sensitive robustness over models trained for overall
robustness.
For the single pair task, we selected three representative adversarial goals: a low vulnerability pair
(0, 2), medium vulnerability pair (6, 5) and high vulnerability pair (4, 9). We selected these pairs
by considering the robust error results on the overall-robustness trained model (Figure 1(b)) as a
rough measure for transformation hardness. This is generally consistent with intuitions about the
MNIST digit classes (e.g., 9 and 4 look similar, so are harder to induce robustness against adversarial
transformation), as well as with the visualization results produced by dimension reduction techniques,
such as t-SNE (Maaten & Hinton, 2008).
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Table 2: Comparison results of different robust defense models for tasks with real-valued cost matrix.
Dataset Task Sparsity Candidates Best α
Classification Error Robust Cost
baseline ours baseline ours
MNIST small-large 45/90 10000 0.04 3.39% 3.47% 2.245 0.947
MNIST large-small 45/90 10000 0.04 3.39% 3.13% 3.344 1.549
CIFAR vehicle 40/90 4000 0.1 31.80% 26.19% 4.183 3.095
Similarly, for the single seed and single target tasks we select three representative examples repre-
senting low, medium, and high vulnerability to include in Table 1 and provide full results for all
the single-seed and single target tasks for MNIST in Figure 2. For the multiple transformations
task, we consider four variations: (i) the ten most vulnerable seed-target transformations; (ii) ten
randomly-selected seed-target transformations; (iii) all the class transformations from odd digit seed
to any other class; (iv) all the class transformations from even digit seed to any other class.
Table 1 summarizes the results, comparing the cost-sensitive robust error between the baseline model
trained for overall robustness and a model trained using our cost-sensitive robust optimization. The
cost-sensitive robust defense model is trained with  = 0.2 based on loss function (3.2) and the
corresponding cost matrix C. The regularization parameter α is tuned via cross validation (see
Appendix A for details). We report the selected best α, classification error and cost-sensitive robust
error on the testing dataset.
Our model achieves a substantial improvement on the cost-sensitive robustness compared with the
baseline model on all of the considered tasks, with no significant increases in normal classification
error. The cost-sensitive robust error reduction varies from 30% to 90%, and is generally higher for
sparse cost matrices. In particular, our classifier reduces the number of cost-sensitive adversarial
examples from 198 to 12 on the single target task with digit 1 as the target class.
Real-valued Cost Matrices. Loosely motivated by a check forging adversary who obtains value by
changing the semantic interpretation of a number (Papernot et al., 2016), we consider two real-valued
cost matrices: small-large, where only adversarial transformations from a smaller digit class to a
larger one are valued, and the cost of valued-transformation is quadratic with the absolute difference
between the seed and target class digits: Cij = (i − j)2 if j > i, otherwise Cij = 0; large-small:
only adversarial transformations from a larger digit class to a smaller one are valued: Cij = (i− j)2
if i > j, otherwise Cij = 0. We tune α for the cost-sensitive robust model on the training MNIST
dataset via cross validation, and set all the other parameters the same as in the binary case. The
certified robust error for every adversarial transformation on MNIST testing dataset is shown in
Figure 3, and the classification error and robust cost are given in Table 2. Compared with the
model trained for overall robustness (Figure 1(b)), our trained classifier achieves stronger robustness
guarantees on the adversarial transformations that induce costs, especially for those with larger costs.
4.2 CIFAR10
We use the same neural network architecture for the CIFAR10 dataset as Wong et al. (2018), with
four convolutional layers and two fully-connected layers. For memory and computational efficiency,
we incorporate the approximation technique based on nonlinear random projection during the training
phase (Wong et al. (2018), §3.2). We train both the baseline model and our model using random
projection of 50 dimensions, and optimize the training objective using SGD. Other parameters such
as learning rate and batch size are set as same as those in Wong et al. (2018).
Given a specific task, we train the cost-sensitive robust classifier on 80% randomly-selected training
examples, and tune the regularization parameter α according to the performance on the remaining
examples as validation dataset. The tasks are similar to those for MNIST (§4.1), except for the
multiple transformations task we cluster the ten CIFAR10 classes into two large groups: animals and
vehicles, and consider the cases where only transformations between an animal class and a vehicle
class are sensitive, and the converse.
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digit 0
digit 1
digit 2
digit 3
digit 4
digit 5
digit 6
digit 7
digit 8
digit 9
digit 0
digit 1
digit 2
digit 3
digit 4
digit 5
digit 6
digit 7
digit 8
digit 9
0.7% 1.3% 1.1% 0.6% 1.3% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 0.2%
1.7% 2.2% 1.0% 0.4% 0.6% 0.5% 0.1% 0.5% 0.0%
11.8% 17.6% 5.6% 1.2% 1.1% 0.9% 1.2% 1.7% 0.5%
17.4% 23.1% 36.2% 1.7% 4.8% 0.7% 1.6% 1.8% 1.3%
26.4% 34.5% 20.3% 9.9% 3.6% 2.5% 3.5% 2.9% 5.9%
26.6% 24.7% 21.1% 50.1% 5.5% 3.1% 1.1% 2.5% 1.2%
58.8% 35.6% 61.9% 18.9% 23.7% 26.6% 1.1% 2.2% 0.6%
26.3% 33.3% 40.6% 53.3% 13.1% 8.4% 1.5% 4.4% 3.9%
95.9% 82.4% 98.6% 93.7% 47.2% 62.5% 26.5% 15.5% 4.6%
68.4% 70.1% 84.1% 99.7% 99.6% 79.3% 14.1% 92.9% 48.1%
(a) small-large
digit 0
digit 1
digit 2
digit 3
digit 4
digit 5
digit 6
digit 7
digit 8
digit 9
digit 0
digit 1
digit 2
digit 3
digit 4
digit 5
digit 6
digit 7
digit 8
digit 9
2.2% 49.6% 38.4% 42.6% 83.5% 95.4% 82.9% 93.7% 99.2%
0.4% 24.6% 73.3% 96.7% 93.0% 96.8% 94.9% 99.9% 87.0%
1.0% 2.2% 53.4% 18.1% 27.2% 29.6% 49.0% 86.4% 54.2%
0.3% 0.4% 3.8% 7.7% 52.6% 11.2% 38.5% 78.0% 84.7%
1.1% 0.5% 1.3% 1.0% 6.1% 17.1% 25.2% 74.5% 70.2%
0.7% 0.3% 0.8% 4.2% 2.1% 19.4% 10.1% 61.1% 68.7%
1.6% 0.9% 2.3% 1.4% 2.4% 3.9% 1.9% 23.3% 6.8%
0.2% 1.3% 3.0% 3.7% 3.2% 2.1% 1.4% 16.2% 56.9%
0.5% 0.6% 2.3% 3.0% 1.9% 3.6% 5.0% 4.8% 23.0%
0.9% 2.0% 1.9% 3.1% 4.4% 4.9% 2.0% 5.2% 9.6%
(b) large-small
Figure 3: Heatmaps of robust test error using our cost-sensitive robust classifier on MNIST for various
real-valued cost tasks: (a) small-large; (b) large-small.
Table 3: Cost-sensitive robust models for CIFAR10 dataset against adversarial examples,  = 2/255.
Task Description Sparsity Candidates Best α
Classification Error Robust Error
baseline ours baseline ours
single pair (frog, bird) 1/90 1000 10.0 31.80% 27.88% 19.90% 1.20%(cat, plane) 1/90 1000 10.0 31.80% 28.63% 9.30% 2.60%
single seed dog 9/90 1000 0.2 31.80% 30.69% 57.20% 28.90%truck 9/90 1000 0.8 31.80% 31.55% 35.60% 15.40%
single target deer 9/90 9000 0.1 31.80% 26.69% 16.99% 3.77%ship 9/90 9000 0.1 31.80% 24.80% 9.42% 3.06%
multiple A-V 24/90 6000 0.1 31.80% 26.65% 16.67% 7.42%V-A 24/90 4000 0.2 31.80% 27.60% 12.07% 8.00%
Table 3 shows results on the testing data based on different robust defense models with  = 2/255.
For all of the aforementioned tasks, our models substantially reduce the cost-sensitive robust error
while keeping a lower classification error than the baseline.
For the real-valued task, we are concerned with adversarial transformations from seed examples
in vehicle classes to other target classes. In addition, more cost is placed on transformations from
vehicle to animal, which is 10 times larger compared with that from vehicle to vehicle. Figures 4(a)
and 4(b) illustrate the pairwise robust test error using overall robust model and the proposed classifier
for the aforementioned real-valued task on CIFAR10.
4.3 VARYING ADVERSARY STRENGTH
We investigate the performance of our model against different levels of adversarial strength by
varying the value of  that defines the `∞ ball available to the adversary. Figure 5 show the overall
classification and cost-sensitive robust error of our best trained model, compared with the baseline
model, on the MNIST single seed task with digit 9 and CIFAR single seed task with dog as the seed
class of concern, as we vary the maximum `∞ perturbation distance.
Under all the considered attack models, the proposed classifier achieves better cost-sensitive adversar-
ial robustness than the baseline, while maintaining similar classification accuracy on original data
points. As the adversarial strength increases, the improvement for cost-sensitive robustness over
overall robustness becomes more significant.
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plane car bird cat
deer dog frog
horse ship
truck
plane
car
bird
cat
deer
dog
frog
horse
ship
truck
7.2% 8.9% 9.5% 8.4% 8.0% 4.9% 7.4% 20.7% 10.7%
7.4% 4.0% 7.2% 4.2% 5.7% 3.2% 3.8% 8.8% 18.5%
20.8% 8.3% 38.9% 43.2% 35.7% 23.4% 19.1% 11.2% 8.6%
9.3% 5.2% 13.9% 18.6% 31.6% 14.3% 11.0% 6.8% 7.4%
12.9% 3.5% 22.1% 31.2% 25.9% 18.5% 19.8% 7.3% 4.7%
8.2% 3.6% 15.8% 46.9% 17.3% 11.5% 12.7% 6.5% 5.6%
7.3% 5.1% 19.9% 31.7% 30.5% 24.0% 10.9% 4.8% 5.9%
8.2% 4.6% 13.2% 24.7% 18.5% 24.4% 9.2% 5.7% 7.8%
14.0% 9.3% 5.3% 6.5% 4.6% 5.6% 3.1% 3.7% 9.8%
12.7% 20.9% 7.2% 10.4% 7.6% 8.4% 5.2% 9.2% 13.0%
(a) baseline model
plane car bird cat
deer dog frog
horse ship
truck
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ship
truck
11.2% 7.3% 6.7% 5.3% 6.8% 4.0% 5.3% 17.3% 12.8%
9.2% 3.5% 3.7% 2.2% 3.3% 1.8% 2.4% 10.2% 24.0%
50.5% 31.0% 56.9% 49.3% 58.1% 43.1% 44.7% 29.5% 32.6%
38.2% 32.8% 52.9% 42.2% 79.3% 37.9% 45.9% 28.6% 38.4%
71.1% 49.3% 85.8% 79.1% 79.0% 65.7% 79.9% 45.2% 54.4%
29.8% 22.9% 44.5% 63.5% 34.1% 30.6% 41.6% 21.9% 27.6%
49.1% 46.3% 75.7% 74.0% 64.5% 68.9% 53.7% 32.6% 50.2%
35.2% 26.9% 36.7% 39.1% 39.5% 47.8% 21.7% 22.2% 35.0%
26.7% 11.5% 5.0% 4.7% 3.9% 4.6% 2.7% 3.4% 11.1%
15.5% 25.7% 4.4% 5.4% 3.7% 5.6% 3.6% 5.6% 13.7%
(b) our model
Figure 4: Heatmaps of robust test error for the real-valued task on CIFAR10 using different robust
classifiers: (a) baseline model; (b) our proposed cost-sensitive robust model.
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Figure 5: Results for different adversary strengths, , for different settings: (a) MNIST single seed
task with digit 9 as the chosen class; (b) CIFAR10 single seed task with dog as the chosen class.
5 CONCLUSION
By focusing on overall robustness, previous robustness training methods expend a large fraction of the
capacity of the network on unimportant transformations. We argue that for most scenarios, the actual
harm caused by an adversarial transformation often varies depending on the seed and target class,
so robust training methods should be designed to account for these differences. By incorporating a
cost matrix into the training objective, we develop a general method for producing a cost-sensitive
robust classifier. Our experimental results show that our cost-sensitive training method works across
a variety of different types of cost matrices, so we believe it can be generalized to other cost matrix
scenarios that would be found in realistic applications.
There remains a large gap between the small models and limited attacker capabilities for which
we can achieve certifiable robustness, and the complex models and unconstrained attacks that may
be important in practice. The scalability of our techniques is limited to the toy models and simple
attack norms for which certifiable robustness is currently feasible, so considerable process is needed
before they could be applied to realistic scenarios. However, we hope that considering cost-sensitive
robustness instead of overall robustness is a step towards achieving more realistic robustness goals.
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AVAILABILITY
Our implementation, including code for reproducing all our experiments, is available as open source
code at https://github.com/xiaozhanguva/Cost-Sensitive-Robustness.
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Cost-Sensitive Robustness against Adversarial Examples
Supplemental Materials
A PARAMETER TUNING
For experiments on the MNIST dataset, we first perform a coarse tuning on regularization parameter
α with searching grid {10−2, 10−1, 100, 101, 102}, and select the most appropriate one, denoted by
αcoarse, with overall classification error less than 4% and the lowest cost-sensitive robust error on
validation dataset. Then, we further finely tune α from the range {2−3, 2−2, 2−1, 20, 21, 22, 23} ·
αcoarse, and choose the best robust model according to the same criteria.
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show the learning curves for task B with digit 9 as the selected seed class based
on the proposed cost-sensitive robust model with varying α (we show digit 9 because it is one of the
most vulnerable seed classes). The results suggest that as the value of α increases, the corresponding
classifier will have a lower cost-sensitive robust error but a higher classification error, which is what
we expect from the design of (3.2).
We observe similar trends for the learning curves for the other tasks, so do not present them here. For
the CIFAR10 experiments, a similar tuning strategy is implemented. The only difference is that we
use 35% as the threshold of overall classification error for selecting the best α.
0 20 40 60
Number of training epochs
1%
10%
100%
Cl
as
sif
ica
tio
n 
er
ro
r
4%
alpha=0.01
alpha=0.1
alpha=1.0
alpha=10.0
(a) classification error
0 20 40 60
Number of training epochs
1%
10%
100%
Co
st
-s
en
sit
iv
e 
ro
bu
st
 e
rro
r alpha=0.01alpha=0.1
alpha=1.0
alpha=10.0
(b) cost-sensitive robust error
Figure 6: Learning curves for single seed task with digit 9 as the selected seed class on MNIST using
the proposed model with varying α: (a) learning curves of classification error; (b) learning curves of
cost-sensitive robust error. The maximum perturbation distance is specified as  = 0.2.
B COMPARISON WITH STANDARD COST-SENSITIVE CLASSIFIER
As discussed in Section 2.4, prior work on cost-sensitive learning mainly focuses on the non-
adversarial setting. In this section, we investigate the robustness of the cross-entropy based cost-
sensitive classifier proposed in Khan et al. (2018), and compare the performance of their classifier
with our proposed cost-sensitive robust classifier. Given a set of training examples {(xi, yi)}Ni=1
and cost matrix C with each entry representing the cost of the corresponding misclassification, the
evaluation metric for cost-sensitive learning is defined as the average cost of misclassifications, or
more concretely
misclassfication cost =
1
N
∑
i∈[N ]
Cyiŷi , where ŷi = argmax
j∈[m]
[fθ(xi)]j ,
where m is the total number of class labels and fθ(·) denotes the neural network classifier as
introduced in Section 2.1. In addition, the cross-entropy based cost-sensitive training objective takes
the following form:
minimize
θ
1
N
∑
j∈[m]
∑
i|yi=j
log
(
1 +
∑
j′ 6=j
Cjj′ · exp
(
[fθ(xi)]j′ − [fθ(xi)]j
))
. (B.1)
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Table 4: Comparison results of different trained classifiers for small-large real-valued task on MNIST
with maximum perturbation distance  = 0.2.
Classifier Classification Error Misclassification Cost Robust Cost
Baseline 0.91% 0.054 85.197
Cost-Sensitive Standard 2.57% 0.016 85.197
Overall Robustness 3.49% 0.252 1.982
Cost-Sensitive Robustness 3.38% 0.060 0.915
To provide a fair comparison, we assume the cost matrix used for (B.1) coincides with the cost matrix
used for cost-sensitive robust training (3.2) in our experiment, whereas they are unlikely to be the
same for real security applications. For instance, misclassifying a benign program as malicious may
still induce some cost in the non-adversarial setting, whereas the adversary may only benefit from
transforming a malicious program into a benign one.
We consider the small-large real-valued task for MNIST, where the cost matrix C is designed
as Cij = 0.1, if i > j; Cij = 0, if i = j; Cij = (i − j)2, otherwise. Table 4 demonstrates the
comparison results of different classifiers in such setting: the baseline standard deep learning classifier,
a standard cost-sensitive classifier (Khan et al., 2018) trained using (B.1), classifier trained for overall
robustness (Wong & Kolter, 2018) and our proposed classifier trained for cost-sensitive robustness.
Compared with baseline, the standard cost-sensitive classifier indeed reduces the misclassification
cost. But, it does not provide any improvement on the robust cost, as defined in (3.1). In sharp
contrast, our robust training method significantly improves the cost-sensitive robustness.
14
